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This article explores the justifications for protecting
mediation communications from disclosure. It reviews
the existing legal protections for mediated dispute
settlement discussions. The major issues that seem to
arise when statutory reform is considered are
identified, and a recent study of the issue by the
Manitoba Law Reform Commission is described and
critiqued. The author argues that a distinction should
be made between circumstances in which a party is
required or permitted to testify about what took place
in mediation, and circumstances in which the mediator
may be required to do so. He suggests that mere
extension to mediation of the common law privilege for
settlement discussions is inadequate, particularly as a
basis for determining whether the mediator should be
compelled to testify.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Mediation is increasingly being used as a means of resolving
disputes. Disputants are resorting to it in growing numbers, and in
widening varieties of circumstances. Courts and tribunals are
encouraging the voluntary use of mediation and are even mandating
participation in mediation. Participants in mediation are told, and have
an expectation, that their discussions will be kept confidential. It seems
unlikely that they would participate in a meaningful and productive way
without that assurance and expectation. In the long run, mediation may
not flourish if reasonable expectations of confidentiality are not met.
Mediators cannot promise that the mediation process will be
entirely confidential, however. Disclosure may be compelled by the legal
system for various reasons. Indeed, the very interests served by
maintaining the confidentiality of communications in mediation require
that there be some exceptions to that confidentiality. With the increased
use of mediation will come increased testing of the limits of
confidentiality in mediation. The nature of the protection that is, or
ought to be, available is a matter of debate and concern for mediators
and for those using or considering using mediation.
This article explores the justifications for protecting mediation
communications from voluntary or compelled disclosure. It reviews the
existing legal protections for mediated dispute settlement discussions.
The major issues that seem to arise when statutory reform is considered
are identified, and a recent Canadian study of the issue is described and
critiqued.
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II. THE NATURE OF MEDIATION
Mediation is assisted negotiation. The negotiating parties are
assisted in their endeavours by an acceptable third party, the mediator,
who has no personal interest in the subject matter of the negotiation.
The mediator has no power to impose a result on the parties, who retain
for themselves the power to determine the outcome: to agree on a
resolution to the problem or opportunity that is the subject of the
negotiation, or to choose, instead, to pursue whatever alternatives to
agreement are available to them.
The mediator's function is to help the parties work their way
through the process of negotiation by facilitating and enhancing their
communication with one another. To that end, a mediator may perform
a variety of roles:
The opener of communication channels, who initiates communication or facilitates better
communication if the parties are already talking.
The legitimizer, who helps all parties recognize the right of others to be involved in
negotiations.
The process facilitator, who provides a procedure and often formally chairs the
negotiation session.
The trainer, who educates novice, unskilled, or unprepared negotiators in the bargaining
process.
The resource expander, who provides procedural assistance to the parties and links them
to outside experts and resources (for example, lawyers, technical experts, decision
makers, or additional goods for exchange) that may enable them to enlarge acceptable
settlement options.
Theproblem explorer, who enables people in disputeto examine aproblem from a variety
of viewpoints, assists in defining basic issues and interests, and looks for mutually
satisfactory options.
The agent of reality, who helps build a reasonable and implementable settlement and
questions and challenges parties who have extreme and unrealistic goals.
The scapegoat, who may take some of the responsibility or blame for an unpopular
decision that the parties are nevertheless willing to accept. This enables them to maintain
their integrity and, when appropriate, gain the support of their constituents.
The leader, who takes the initiative to move the negotiations forward by procedural-or
on occasion, substantive-suggestions. 1
1 C.W. Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict, 2d ed. (San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996) [hereinafter The Mediation Process] at 18-19 [emphasis in original].
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As the mediation progresses, these roles may be played both in meetings
with the parties together in joint session, and in meetings in caucus with
one party separately from the other(s). The process may require more
than just encouragement of candour, reflection, recognition, and
empathy. It may also involve refraining and even filtering the parties'
communications, while moving between them as a shuttle diplomat.
Lon Fuller offered his view of what the mediator adds to
ordinary, unassisted negotiations:
Where the bargaining process proceeds without the aid of a mediator the usual course
pursued by experienced negotiators is something like this: the parties begin by simply
talking about the various proposals, explaining in general terms why they want this and
why they are opposed to that. During this exploratory or "sounding out" process, which
proceeds without any clear-cut offers of settlement, each party conveys-sometimes
explicitly, sometimes tacitly, sometimes intentionally, sometimes inadvertently-
something about his relative evaluations of the various items under discussion. After
these discussions have proceeded for some time, one party is likely to offer a "package
deal," proposing in general terms a contract that will settle all the issues under discussion.
This offer may be accepted by the other party or he may accept it subject to certain
stipulated changes.
Now it is obvious that the process just described can often be greatly facilitated
through the services of a skillful mediator. His assistance can speed the negotiations,
reduce the likelihood of miscalculation, and generally help the parties to reach a sounder
agreement, an adjustment of their divergent valuations that will produce something like
an optimum yield of the gains of reciprocity. These things the mediator can accomplish
by holding separate confidential meetings with the parties, where each party gives the
mediator a relatively full and candid account of the internal posture of his own interests.
Armed with this information, but without making a premature disclosure of its details,
the mediator can then help to shape the negotiations in such a way that they will proceed
most directly to their goal, with a minimum of waste and friction. 2
These generic descriptions of mediation and the mediator's role
apply whether the mediation is concerned with resolving a dispute or
reaching an agreement on the terms of a business relationship or
transaction.
III. THE NEED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION
It is generally thought that an expectation of confidentiality on
the part of participants is critical to a successful mediation process.3
2 L.L. Fuller, "Mediation-Its Forms and Functions" (1971) 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 305 at 318
[footnote omitted].
3 See J. Folberg & A. Taylor, Mediatiorn A Comprehensive Guide to Resolving Conflicts Without
Litigation (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1984) at 264; L.R. Freedman & M.L. Prigoff,
"Confidentiality in Mediation: The Need for Protection" (1986) 2 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 37;
M.L. Prigoff, "Toward Candor or Chaos: The Case of Confidentiality in Mediation" (1988) 12
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The mediator encourages the parties to be candid with the
mediator and each other, not just about their willingness to compromise,
but also and especially about the needs and interests that underlie their
positions. As those needs and interests surface, the possibility of finding
a satisfactory resolution increases. The parties will be wary and guarded
in their communications if they think that the information they reveal
may later be used outside of the mediation process to their possible
disadvantage. When they have resorted to mediation in an attempt to
settle pending or threatened litigation, they will be particularly alert to
the possibility that information they reveal to others in mediation may
later be used against them by those others in that, or other, litigation.
The parties may also be concerned that their communications might be
used by other adversaries or potential adversaries, including public
authorities, in other present or future conflicts. The possibility of
prejudice to legal rights, or of exposure to legal liability or prosecution,
may not be a party's only concern. Parties may also be concerned that
disclosure of information they reveal in the mediation process may
prejudice them in commercial dealings or embarrass them in their
personal lives. Accordingly, mediation works best if the parties are
assured that their discussions with each other and with the mediator will
be kept confidential.
The need for confidentiality exists in all settlement negotiations,
mediated and unmediated. Nonetheless, the addition of a mediator to
the negotiation process creates additional issues about confidentiality.
In addition to discussions in joint session, in which both (or all)
parties are present with the mediator and each hears what the other(s)
says, mediation often involves the mediator's meeting with parties
separately, in "caucus." During a caucus, the mediator may explore a
party's motivations and expectations, provide education and coaching
with respect to the negotiation process, act as a sounding board, engage
in reality checking, and assist in identifying options that might be
brought to the bargaining table.4 The mediator may also test the
acceptability of proposals that he or she has generated, or of proposals
Seton Hall Legis. J. 1; A. Kirtley, "The Mediation Privilege's Transition from Theory to
Implementation: Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Participants, the
Process and the Public Interest" (1995) J. of Disp. Resol. 1 at 8; and "Protecting Confidentiality in
Mediation" Note (1984) 98 Harv. L. Rev. 441 at 444-45 [hereinafter "Protecting Confidentiality in
Mediation".]. Critics argue that there is no evidence that mediation requires absolute confidentiality
in order to function effectively: see E.D. Green, "A Heretical View of the Mediation Privilege"
(1986) 2 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 1; and K. Gibson, "Confidentiality in Mediation: A Moral
Reassessment" (1992) J. of Disp. Resol. 25 at 40.
4 See The Mediation Process, supra note 1 at 319-20. See generally C.W. Moore, "The Caucus:
Private Meetings That Promote Settlement" (1987) 16 Mediation Q. 87.
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generated by the opposite party in caucus but presented as the
mediator's own. A party may wish, or be encouraged, to share with the
mediator information that he or she is not prepared to communicate to,
and wishes to be kept confidential from, the other during the mediation
process.S Parties will be reluctant to do this without the assurance that
the mediator is both willing and able to maintain the desired
confidentiality.
A party's concern that certain communications with the mediator
be kept confidential within the mediation process may sometimes be
temporary. The information may be such that its revelation at an
appropriate time and in an appropriate way during the mediation
process may be beneficial. The party may eventually be persuaded that
the potential benefit to the process of disclosure outweighs the perceived
risk. On the other hand, the information may be of a sort that would not
advance the negotiations if revealed, or the party may not be persuaded
that it should be revealed. Even then, the information may have assisted
the mediator in moving the process forward. In any event, potentially
useful information would not be available to the mediator in caucus
without a clear understanding that caucus communications designated or
understood to be confidential would be kept confidential by the
mediator both within and outside the mediation process.
Mediating parties and mediators are naturally concerned,
therefore, about the extent to which communications in mediation can,
or should, be kept confidential. They will usually address this in the
contract or rules that they agree will govern the mediation.6 These will
generally provide that all participants will keep mediation
communications confidential and that the parties will not seek to compel
the mediator to testify about mediation communications, or to produce
his or her notes of those communications, in any subsequent legal
proceeding. These contractual rules may provide for exceptions
reflecting the parties' sense of the circumstances in which they or the
mediator should be free to (or may be required to) disclose something
about their discussions. Whether or not exceptions to confidentiality are
expressly provided in the rules that the parties and the mediator
5 See The Mediation Process, supra note I at 323-26.
6 See A.J. Stitt, "Mediation" in A.J. Stitt, ed., Alternative Dispute Resohtion Practice Manual,
looseleaf (Toronto: CCH Canadian Ltd., 1998) para. 2000 at 2030; C.U.C. MacLeod, "Liability of
ADR Neutrals," in ibid., para. 50,180 at 50,195; "Arbitration and Mediation Institute of Canada
Inc.: Rules of Procedure for Commercial Mediation" in ibid., para. 123,000 at 123,050 (14-15); and
"Arbitration and Mediation Institute of Ontario: Rules of Procedure for Mediation" in ibid., para.
129,000 at 129,030 (23-24).
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establish for their mediation, there will be legal limits on their ability to
maintain confidentiality with respect to what takes place in mediation.
Either the mediator or a mediation participant may be under a
legal obligation to report certain information to others if they receive it.
For example, many jurisdictions require that information concerning
harm done, or a risk of harm, to a child be reported to the appropriate
authorities. 7 Health professionals, and perhaps others, may have an
obligation to report threats to harm a third party to that third party.8
Further, members of professional organizations may have a duty to
report the apparent misconduct or incompetence of other members to
their profession's governing body.9
There is also the prospect that a court or tribunal may require
that a party or the mediator testify about information received or
observations made during mediation. The contractual rules under which
the mediation was conducted may not effectively preclude this,
particularly if the testimony is sought by a stranger to the mediation. A
stranger will not be bound by a contract between the parties and the
mediator. Indeed, the parties themselves may not be bound by their
contract in this respect, as such an agreement may be void as contrary to
public policy to the extent that it purports to prevent the introduction
into evidence of relevant information not privileged from disclosure as a
matter of law.10
7 In Ontario, for example, this obligation arises under section 72 of the Child and Family
Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-11.
8 See J.R. Murphy III, "In the Wake of Tarasoff: Mediation and the Duty to Disclose" (1985-
86) 35 Cath. U. L. Rev. 209; and R.D. Manes & M.P. Silver, The Law of Confidential
Communications in Canada (Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 1996) at 31-33.
9 See C.C. Hess, "To Disclose or Not to Disclose: The Relationship Between Confidentiality
in Mediation and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct" (1991) 95 Dick. L. Rev. 601; M. Irvine,
"Serving Two Masters: The Obligation Under the Rules of Professional Conduct to Report
Attorney Misconduct in a Confidential Mediation" (1994) 26 Rutgers L. J. 155; and I.S. Said, "The
Mediator's Dilemma: The Legal Requirements Exception to Confidentiality Under the Texas ADR
Statute" (1995) 36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 579 at 612ff.
10 See "Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation," supra note 3 at 450-51; Freedman & Prigoff,
supra note 3 at 41; Prigoff, supra note 3 at 7; and Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Confidentiality
of Mediation Proceedings (Winnipeg: Manitoba Law Reform Commission, 1996) at 31, note 26
[hereinafter Confidentiality of Mediation Proceedings]. An argument may be made that by entering
into the agreement each of the parties has encouraged the other to reveal confidential information
which neither may then use "as a springboard for activities detrimental to the person who made the
confidential communication": Slavutych v. Baker, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 254 at 262 [hereinafter Slavutych],
Spence J. quoting with approval from Lord Denning, M.R. in Seager v. Copydex, Ltd., [1967] 2 All
E.R. 415 at 417 (C.A.). This is an instance in which the information is privileged from disclosure by
operation of a rule of equity, however, and the critical question remains the scope of the law's
protection and not that of the agreement. The equitable principle applied in Slavuych appears to
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The issue of confidentiality is addressed in standards of practice
promulgated by organizations of dispute resolution professionals. These
typically require that mediators meet the reasonable expectations of the
parties with regard to confidentiality;11 that mediators discuss those
expectations with the parties; that they "inform the parties of the
limitations of confidentiality such as statutory, judicially or ethically
mandated reporting prior to undertaking the mediation;" 12 and in some
cases, even that mediators "inform the parties of circumstances under
which mediators may be compelled to testify in court."13
Mediators are generally concerned that they not be compelled to
testify about information received from mediation participants, or
disclose notes made or opinions formed during a mediation, for reasons
that go beyond meeting the expectations of confidentiality of the parties
to that mediation. Those who might in future make use of that
mediator's services will be deterred if they feel that the mediator will not
or cannot maintain confidentiality. Once a mediator has been
compelled to testify against the interests of a mediating party, it is likely
that that party, at least, will no longer regard the mediator as impartial,
no matter how objective the testimony may have been. 14 The spectre of
the mediator's having testified "for" or "against" other mediating parties
may undermine the faith that prospective mediation participants might
otherwise have had in the impartiality of the mediator and in the
mediation process itself.
Disputants may be deterred from resorting to mediation
voluntarily, or from participating meaningfully in a mandatory
mediation, if they know that a mediator may later be compelled to testify
against their interests. The prospect of having to testify may lead
mediators to alter the way they conduct mediations, to the possible
be subject to a fairly broad "public interest" exception that may severely limit its application: see
J.A. Epp, "Civil Pretrial Conference Privilege: 'A Cosmic Black Hole'?" (1993) 72 Can. Bar. Rev.
337 at 359.
11 See American Arbitration Association, American Bar Association and the Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution, Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators (Washington, D.C.:
AAA, ABA, SPIDR, 1995) Standard V.
12 American Bar Association Family Law Section Taskforce, Proposed Standards of Practice for
Lawyers Who Conduct Divorce and Family Mediation, Standard VIII, Comment (C), online: Family
Mediation Standards <http:llwww.mediate.com/ethics/abafamstds.cfm> (date accessed: 9 June
1999).
13 Academy of Family Mediators and the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts,
Standards of Practice for Divorce and Family Mediation, online: AFM-AFCC Standards of Practice
<http:l/www.mediate.com/ethics/afmstd.cfm> (date accessed: 9 June 1999).
14 See P.J. Harter, "Neither Cop Nor Collection Agent: Encouraging Administrative
Settlements by Ensuring Mediator Confidentiality" (1989) 41 Admin. L. Rev. 315 at 325.
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detriment of the process. For example, some mediators may be more
restrained in making notes they might otherwise use to record their
insights for later use in formulating or revising their mediation plans.15
Others may limit the information they solicit in order to limit the
prospect of being called to testify or the impact their testimony may have
on the parties. They may increase their note-taking so that they can be
better prepared to testify if called upon to do So.16
IV. LEGAL BASES FOR PROTECTING MEDIATED
SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS
One basic premise of adversarial litigation is that all relevant
probative evidence relating to the issues in dispute should be available to
the court or tribunal called upon to resolve the dispute. Witnesses may
be compelled to provide such evidence, even if it arose out of
communications that the participants regarded as confidential. Relevant,
trustworthy, and probative evidence may be excluded, however, if doing
so serves some judicial or public policy that outweighs the public interest
in having all relevant and probative evidence admitted. This is the basis
on which a limited range of confidential communications are treated as
privileged and inadmissible at common law. 1 7 Solicitor-client
communications, for example, are given this protection because such
communications are regarded as essential to the effective operation of
the legal system.18
A. The Common Law Privilege For Settlement Communications
Communications made by the parties in an attempt to settle a
dispute that is the subject of pending or contemplated litigation are
generally treated as inadmissible at common law.19 There is more than
15 See ibid.
16 See J.P. McCrory, "Confidentiality in Mediation of Matrimonial Disputes" (1988) 51 Mod.
L. Rev. 442 at 454.
1 7 See R. v. Gruenke, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 263 at 295, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. [hereinafter Gruenke].
18 See ibid. at 288-89, Lamer C.J.
19 See Pine v. Wyd (1886), 11 O.R. 422 (C.A.) [hereinafter Pine].
1998]
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one possible rationale for this.20 One explanation is that concessions
and offers made in settlement discussions are excluded as irrelevant
because they are hypothetical, conditional, or reflect only a desire to
purchase peace, and therefore cannot constitute admissions. Another is
that when parties to a dispute engage in communications made expressly
or impliedly "without prejudice," they do so subject to an implied
agreement to preserve confidentiality. The third possible explanation is
that settlement communications are excluded on grounds of public
policy, because there is a public interest in encouraging the settlement of
disputes without involving the courts.
The relevancy rationale appears to be the basis for the common
law exclusion in the United States.2 1 As a result, the common law
exclusion there is rather narrow, applying only to offers of settlement
themselves and not to any surrounding discussion severable from such
offers. Rule 408 of the United States Federal Rules of Evidence
provides a broader exclusion of "evidence of conduct or statements
made in compromise negotiations."22 This rule, however, only makes
the evidence inadmissible as proof of liability for, or invalidity of, a claim
or its amount. It does not exclude such evidence when offered for some
other purpose, such as to prove the bias or prejudice of a witness or to
negative a contention of undue delay. The rule does not create a
privilege and, so, does not restrict compelled disclosure during
discovery23 or in administrative or legislative proceedings. A mediation
party who is not party to the litigation in which disclosure is sought
20 See D. Vaver, "'Without Prejudice' Communications-Their Admissibility and Effect"
(1974) 9 U.B.C. L. Rev. 85; P.M. Perell, "The Problems of Without Prejudice" (1992) 71 Can. Bar
Rev. 223; and J. Sopinka, S.N. Lederman & A.W. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada
(Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 1992) at 719-22.
21 See K.L. Brown, "Confidentiality in Mediation: Status and Implications" (1991) 1:2 J. of
Disp. Resol. 307 at 312; Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 3 at 40; Green, supra note 3; Kirtley, supra
note 3 at 11-13; "Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation," supra note 3 at 447; and Harter, supra
note 14 at 328ff.
22 Fed. R. Evid. 408 provides:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or
offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to
compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to
prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or
statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not
require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented
in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when
the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness,
negativing a contention of undue delay or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal
investigation or prosecution.
23 See Harter, supra note 14 at 330; and Kirtley, supra note 3 at 13.
676 [VOL. 36 No. 4
Confidentiality in Mediation
cannot raise an objection to the admission of confidential
communications. 24
In Anglo-Canadian law, on the other hand, a public or judicial
policy of encouraging settlement is the predominant explanation for the
exclusion of evidence of settlement communications. 25 A privilege
applies to communications made when a litigious dispute was in
existence or within contemplation, for the purpose of attempting to
effect a settlement, with the express or implied intention that it would
not be disclosed to the court if the attempt failed. 26 The privilege
applies both at discovery and at trial.27 It operates to exclude evidence
of settlement discussions in proceedings between the mediation
participants. It will also operate against strangers to the discussions in at
least some situations.28
The privilege for settlement communications does not apply to
all communications made in the attempt to settle a legal dispute,
however. When it is alleged that settlement discussions resulted in an
agreement, evidence about the discussions will be admitted to prove the
existence or terms of the alleged agreement. 29 If it were otherwise, such
agreements could not be enforced, and the objective of applying the
privilege-encouraging settlement-would be substantially undermined.
It would seem to follow that evidence of the settlement discussions that
led to an agreement would also be received on issues going to the
enforceability of the agreement, where it is alleged that the agreement
achieved at mediation was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, duress,
undue influence, and the like.
Criminal law does not attach a privilege to settlement
communications made outside of a plea-bargaining structure.
24 See Prigoff, supra note 3 at 4.
25 See Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant, supra note 20 at 719; S.B. McNicol, The Law of Privilege
(Sydney: Law Book, 1992) c. 8; U.K., Law Reform Committee, Privilege in Civil Proceedings, Cmnd.
3472 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1967) at 14; Pirie, supra note 19 at 427; and
Middelkamp v. Fraser Valley Real Estate Board (1992), 71 B.C.L.R. (2d) 276 (C.A.) [hereinafter
Middelkamp].
26 See Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant, supra note 20 at 722.
27 See L Waxman & Sons Ltd. v. Texaco Canada Ltd. et al., [1968] 1 O.R. 642 (H.C.J.), affd
[1968] 2 O.R. 452 (C.A.) [hereinafter Waxman & Sons]; and Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant, supra
note 20 at 721.
28 See Waxman & Sons, supra note 27; Ed Miller Sales & Rentals Ltd v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
[1990] 4 W.W.R. 39 (Alta. Q.B.), aff'd. [1990] 5 W.W.R. 377 (Alta. C.A.); and Middelkamp, supra
note 25.
29 See Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant, supra note 20 at 730; and McNicol, supra note 25 at
461ff.
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Admissions made during an attempt to settle civil proceedings may later
be introduced in criminal proceedings30 A statement made during
settlement discussions about a debt to the effect that the debtor is
unable to pay his or her debts is an act of bankruptcy, and may be
introduced as evidence in subsequent bankruptcy proceedings to prove
the commission of an act of bankruptcy.3 1
The courts have also held that the settlement communications
privilege will not preclude evidence of threats made during settlement
discussions.3 2 This exception is not limited to threats of criminal
conduct, contempt, or breach of statute, but will permit evidence of a
threat to introduce into the litigation factual issues that would publicly
embarrass the other party,33 unless the court is satisfied that those issues
would be relevant to the legal dispute between them.3 4 This notion that
relevance to the legal issues determines whether communications are
privileged may extend so far as to permit the admission of any statement
made during settlement discussions that was not relevant to the issues
then being discussed35 Indeed, one provincial court of appeal has
suggested that communications during settlement discussions are not
privileged unless they constitute an offer of settlement or are adjudged
"conducive to arriving at a settlement."3 6
Courts have held that discussions between spouses for the
purpose of effecting a reconciliation are entitled to the same privilege as
30 See R. v.Pabani (1994), 17 O.R. (3d) 659 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [1994] 3
S.C.R. ix, where admissions made by a husband during mediation with his wife concerning his past
physical abuse of her were admitted during his trial for her subsequent murder.
31 See In re Daintrey, exparte Holt, [1893] 2 Q.B. 116.
32 See Kurtz and Company v. Spence and Sons (1887), 58 L.T. 438 (Ch.D.) (threat to challenge
the validity of a patent, such threats being prohibited by statute); Greenwood v. Fits (1961), 29
D.L.R. (2d) 260 (B.C.C.A.) (threat during settlement discussions that party would commit perjury
and suborn witnesses to perjure themselves at trial if the dispute were not settled on his terms, and
would flee the jurisdiction if judgment went against him, admitted to show he did not think lie had a
good case); and 725952 Ontario Ltd. v. Desuri Homes Inc., [1995] O.J. No. 1208 (Ont. Ct. (Gen.
Div.)) (QL) (court refused to strike out portions of an affidavit alleging that during settlement
discussions the opposite party admitted that he had lied during earlier proceedings, stated he would
make up things to complicate the proceedings and make the affiants' lives miserable, and made a
suggestion that the affiants took as an invitation to lie in connection with other proceedings against
a third party).
33 See Underwood v. Cox (1912), 26 O.L.R. 303 (Div. Ct.).
34 See Gagne v. Smooth RockFalls Hospital (1991), 39 C.C.E.L. 274 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)).
35 See Waldridge v. Kennison (1794), 1 Esp. 143, 170 E.R. 306 (N.P.), and see discussion of this
case in Perell, supra note 20 at 230; and Vaver, supra note 20 at 156-57.
3 6 Re Springridge FarmsLtd (1991), 79 D.L.R. (4th) 88 at 92 (Sask. C.A.).
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discussions aimed at settling pending or contemplated litigation.3 7 A
series of English cases concerning reconciliation discussions established
that the privilege for these discussions extends also to the evidence of
persons who assist in the negotiations as mediators. 38 It was found to
protect evidence with respect to communications between the mediator
and one party in the absence of the other,39 as well as communications
between the parties. The privilege was held to belong to the parties,
however, so that if they chose to waive it the mediator could be
compelled to testify.40
In Ontario, the question of whether a privilege attached to
communications between the disputants and the mediator was addressed
in Porter v. Porter.41 There, the parties had retained a psychologist to
assist them as mediator in resolving a custody and access dispute,
agreeing that he was not to be called as a witness in the litigation of their
dispute if the mediation did not result in agreement. When it did not,
however, one spouse sought to introduce into evidence a report the
mediator had written. The court refused to receive it, holding that it was
privileged. It found that a privilege arose both because the parties were
engaged in settlement discussions and because Wigmore's four
conditions for a professional or relationship privilege 42 were satisfied in
the circumstances. That conclusion has been cited with approval in a
decision in at least one non-matrimonial civil case.43
B. Privilege Based on the Wigmore Test For Privilege
The mere fact that communications result from and take place in
a confidential relationship does not mean that they will be treated as
37 See McTaggart v. McTaggart, [1948] 2 All E.R. 754 (C.A.) [hereinafter McTaggart].
38 Seeibid. See also Mole v.Mole, [1950] 2 All E.R. 328 (C.A.) [hereinafter Mole]; Henley v.
Henley, [1955] 1 All E.R. 590 (P.D. & A.) [hereinafter Henley]; Theodoropoulas v. Theodoropoulas,
[1963] 2 All E.R. 772 (P.D. & A.); and Pais v. Pals, [1970] 3 All E.R. 491 (P.D. & A.); and McCrory,
supra note 16.
39 See Mole, supra note 38; and Henley, supra note 38.
40 See McTaggart, supra note 37.
41 (1983), 40 O.R. (2d) 417 (Unif. Fain. Ct.) [hereinafter Porter].
42 See J.H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, rev. by J.T. McNaughton (Boston:
Little Brown, 1961) vol. 8 at para. 2285.
43 See Marchand (Litigation Guardian of) v. Public General Hospital of Chatham [1997] O.J.
No. 1805 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)) (QL).
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privileged by the court.44 Wigmore proposed that such communications
should be treated as privileged only if the following four conditions are
satisfied:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality mustbe essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance
of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained forthe correct disposal of litigation. 45
This test was cited with approval by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Slavutych46 and Gruenke.47
In Gruenke, the Court observed that privileges fall into two
categories: "class" or "blanket" privilege on the one hand, and "case-by-
case" privilege on the other.48 The former refers to a privilege for which
there is a presumption of inadmissibility when the relationship falls
within the class, a presumption that is rebuttable if the party seeking
admission can show that the communication falls within an exception to
the rule. The Court described the solicitor-client privilege as falling
within that category of privilege. Communications arising out of a
relationship not covered by a blanket privilege, on the other hand, are
presumed admissible unless it can be demonstrated, using the Wigmore
test, that the communications should be treated as privileged. The
demonstration must be made on a case-by-case basis, hence the label
used by the Court to describe that category of privilege.
At issue in Gruenke was the admissibility in a murder trial of
statements made by an accused to her church pastor and a lay church
counsellor concerning the murder. Chief Justice Lamer noted that there
would be no basis for a "class" or prima facie privilege for religious
communications unless the policy reasons to support such a privilege
were as compelling as those for the solicitor-client privilege.49 He
observed that
4 4 See Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant, supra note 20 at 623ff.
4 5 Wigmore, supra note 42 [emphasis in original].
4 6 Supra note 10.
4 7 Supra note 17.
48 See ibid. at 286-87.
49 Ibid. at 288-89.
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[t]he prima facie protection for solicitor-client communications is based on the fact that
the relationship and the communications between solicitor and client are essential to the
effective operation of the legal system. Such communications are inextricably linked with
the very system which desires the disclosure of the communication ... .50
As religious communications did not share these characteristics, he
rejected the claim that they should enjoy a class privilege.
It can be argued that during mediation of a dispute that might
otherwise require the courts' adjudication, the mediator and the parties
are engaged in a process inextricably linked with the legal system. While
their communications are not made for the same purpose as solicitor-
client communications, the purpose of the communications is certainly
one that attracts aprima facie privilege on policy grounds when parties
communicate for that purpose without the assistance of a mediator. The
relationship between mediator and disputants should therefore be a
suitable candidate forprima facie protection on the basis of the analysis
in Gruenke.
In Porter,S1 Gravely J. noted that the difficulty in applying the
fourth condition in the context of a matrimonial dispute was the
prospect that the mediation process would generate information of
importance in deciding the future of a child.S2 Thus, it was the public
interest in the correct disposal of litigation concerning the welfare of
children that had to be balanced against the interest in fostering the
mediator-disputant relationship and supporting the mediator's role in
the justice system. Judge Gravely concluded that as a general rule it was
"of far greater importance that parties, with the aid of a mediator, are
able to engage in frank and open discussion that can lead to agreed upon
arrangements in the interests of children than that some information
may be lost to a court in a subsequent proceeding." 53 Other judges,
however, have not been prepared to be as categorical.54 Notwithstanding
the important role played by mediation in the resolution of matters
involving the interests of children, in that context the mediation
relationship seems only to have been accorded a case-by-case privilege in
Ontario.
Labour relations tribunals have been strongly protective of the
mediator's role and have refused to compel mediators to give testimony
50 Ibid. at 289.
5 1 Supra note 41.
5 2 See ibid. at 421.
53 bid.
54 See, for example, Welch v. Welch (1994), 27 C.P.C. (3d) 190 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)).
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about negotiations they have mediated even when evidence of the
parties' direct negotiations would have been admissible. In Carmelo
Pelleriti v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees' and Bartenders' International
Union,SS for example, a discharged employee complained that his trade
union had not represented him fairly during mediation with his former
employer in a grievance arising out of the termination of his
employment. The respondent trade union sought to compel the
testimony of the mediator, a grievance settlement officer employed by
the ministry of labour. The mediator objected to giving evidence. The
relevant statute was silent about whether the mediator was compellable.
Applying the Wigmore test, the Board ruled that he was not compellable
and that his settlement efforts were privileged.
Labour relations legislation in Ontario and other Canadian
jurisdictions has for decades provided for the appointment of a
conciliation officer or mediator to assist the parties in their attempts to
make a collective agreement. While negotiations for a collective
agreement may be said to involve a "dispute," it is not a dispute about
alleged legal rights. Accordingly, the contents of the parties' unassisted
negotiations are not privileged from admission into evidence in any
subsequent legal dispute in which they are relevant. For example,
evidence about the parties' negotiations would be central to a complaint
that a party to collective bargaining had breached its statutory duty to
bargain in good faith and make every reasonable effort to make a
collective agreement.
In 1964, before the governing statute was amended to address
this issue, the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) ruled that a
conciliation board chairman should not be compelled to testify in an
application by a union for consent to prosecute the employer for
bargaining in bad faith, and that communications between one party and
the conciliator in the absence of the other party were confidential and
should be treated as inadmissible.56 Although the Board's decision did
not expressly refer to the Wigmore test, the following passage from its
analysis focused on the elements of that test and, particularly, the
balancing of interests contemplated by the fourth component of the test:
It will usually be an essential first step to any settlement of their differences, through the
efforts of a conciliator, that the parties are willing, frankly and openly, to discuss their
respective positions in private with the conciliator without fear that he will later divulge
55 [1986] O.L.R.B. Rep. 1759.
56 See Building Service Employees' International Union, Local 183 and Trenton Memorial
Hospital (1964), 64 C.L.L.C. 16,302 (O.L.R.B.) [hereinafter Trenton Memorial Hospital]. See also
Retail Clerks Union, Local 401 and 4 Way Wholesale Ltd., [1979] 3 Can. L.R.B.R. 295 (Alta. L.R.B.).
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the confidences of their conversations to the opposite party. One must also take
cognizance of the fact that in bargaining for collective agreement, parties are often
driven, for one reason or another, to adopt rigid or intransigent positions. In such
circumstances, the conciliator will have to utilize all the diplomatic skills at his disposal to
break the resultant stalemate. His capacity to persuade the parties to move from
entrenched positions and to compromise their differences will, in a large measure,
depend upon their willingness to communicate freely to him explanations and
information concerning the matters which induce or compel them to adopt their
respective positions and what compromises or alternatives they might or might not be
persuaded to accept in lieu thereof and in what circumstances....
[It cannot be doubted that much of the explanations and information itself
contained in these communications ... will originate only in the confidence that the
contents of the conversations themselves will not later be disclosed to the other party. It
seems to us that the element of confidentiality is indispensable to the inception and
maintenance of any satisfactory or effective conciliatory relationship between the
conciliator and the parties. It is not unreasonable to expect, therefore, subject to any
exceptional and compelling reasons to the contrary which may exist in the particular case,
that the mandatory and indiscriminate disclosure of these private and confidential
communications would probably result in seriously undermining and damaging the
relationship and the conciliation process as a whole. The resultant detriment to the
labour-relations community and to the public at large which would be occasioned by such
disclosure, would likely eclipse and outweigh any near-sighted benefit to be gained to the
party seeking their disclosure for the immediate purposes of a particular case.
5 7
Labour tribunals and courts in the United States have also
addressed these issues. In NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc. ,S8 for example,
one of the issues in unfair labour practice proceedings before the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had been whether the
respondent employer and the union representing its workers had come
to an oral agreement on the terms of a collective agreement, which the
employer later refused to execute in writing. On a motion by the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMcs), the NLRB quashed a
summons directed to a mediator from the FMCS who had been involved
in the meetings that the union claimed had resulted in agreement. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld that decision. It acknowledged
that the mediator's "tie-breaking" testimony would have been relevant
and, indeed, probably determinative of the conflict in the testimony
given by employer and union witnesses about what had taken place
during negotiations. The court nevertheless accepted the view expressed
by the NLRB in an earlier case, that
[t]o execute successfully their function of assisting in the settlement of labor disputes, the
conciliators must maintain a reputation for impartiality, and the parties to conciliation
conferences must feel free to talk without any fear that the conciliator may subsequently
make disclosures as a witness in some other proceeding, to the possible disadvantage of a
5 7 Trenton Memorial Hospital, supra note 56 at 1245.
58 104 L.R.R.M. 2097 (9th Cir. 1980) [hereinafter Macaluso].
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party to the conference. If conciliators were permitted or required to testify about their
activities, or if the production of notes or reports of their activities could be required, not
even the strictest adherence to purely factual matters would prevent the evidence from
favoring or seeming to favor one side or the other. The inevitable result would be that
the usefulness of the [FMcSl in the settlement of future disputes would be seriously
impaired, if not destroyed. The resultant injury to the public interest would clearly
outweigh the benefit to be derived from making their testimony available in particular
cases.
5 9
The court concluded that "the complete exclusion of mediator testimony
is necessary to the preservation of an effective system of labor
mediation, and that labor mediation is essential to continued industrial
stability, a public interest sufficiently great to outweigh the interest in
obtaining every person's evidence." 60
After the OLRB decision in Trenton Memorial Hospital,6 1 the
Ontario Legislature amended the Labour Relations Act to provide that
ministry officials and appointees are not competent or compellable
witnesses respecting any information they receive when involved in
collective agreement negotiations as mediator or conciliator,6 2 and that
no report of a conciliation officer and "[n]o information or material
furnished to or received by a conciliation officer or a mediator" could be
disclosed except to the minister of labour or certain ministry officials.63
The latter prohibition has been interpreted as precluding a party from
introducing into evidence what was said to or by a mediator in the
absence of the opposite party, when offered to establish that the
opposite party must have knowledge of what was said to, or heard from,
the mediator,64 even if the opposite party does not object to it.65 The
protection afforded by these limitations on disclosure is not solely for
the benefit of the parties in the particular negotiations about which a
question of disclosure later arose; it is for the benefit of the mediation
process itself and cannot be waived by those parties alone.
59 Ibid. at 2100, Wallace J. quoting with approval from Tomlinson of High Point Inc. v. United
Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of Ameica, Local 3023,74 N.L.R.B. Dec. 681 at 685 (N.L.R.B.
1947).
6 0 Supra note 58 at 2100.
61 Supra note 56.
62 See Labour Relations Amendment Act, 1964, S.O. 1964, c. 53, s. 11; now Labour Relations
Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sch. A, s. 120(1).
6 3 IbidL s. 119(2).
64 See Re United Steelworkers of America v. Shaw-Almex Industries Limited, [1984] O.L.R.B.
Rep. 109 at para. 15-16. See also Re Ovenvaitea Food Group, [1996] B.C.LR.B. Dec. 278.
65 See United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. Aristokraft Vinyl Inc., [ 1985]
O.L.R.B. Rep. 799 at para. 14.
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V. ISSUES IN REFORM-CRAFTING A STATUTORY
MEDIATION PRIVILEGE
A. Impressions of the American Experience
Most states in the United States have statutes or court rules that
address the confidentiality of mediation communications.66 Some of
these provide a "blanket" privilege: they simply make all
communications during a mediation inadmissible.6 7 Others more
carefully define the terms used and provide for exceptions where the
interest served by protecting confidentiality is seen as being outweighed
by other interests. The appropriate form and scope of legislated
protection have been mooted in the literature,68 which cumulatively
offers some guidance as to the issues that could or should be addressed
in crafting a mediation privilege.
1. Defining the rule
Enforced confidentiality can be a burden as well as a benefit. To
the extent that what is said and done during mediation cannot be the
subject of testimony in any subsequent proceeding, rights and remedies
that might otherwise flow from the words or actions of other participants
cannot be enforced and do not effectively exist. The participants are in a
different legal regime when they enter the defined circumstances. How
will they know that?69 Must they do something to signify their intention
or consent to enter that different regime? Is an agreement to enter into
mediation sufficient to signify that intention or consent? Must there be
a written agreement to mediate that expressly provides for
confidentiality? Will this different legal regime arise only in a court-
connected mediation, or in one performed by persons who are approved
or have particular credentials?
66 See C.H. Macturk, "Confidentiality in Mediation: The Best Protection Has Exceptions"
(1995) 19 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 411 at 422ff.
67 See Brown, supra note 21 at 331.
68 See, for example, Macturk, supra note 66; Brown, supra note 21; Harter, supra note 14;
Kirtley, supra note 3; J.M. Hyman, "The Model Mediator Confidentiality Rule: A Commentary"
(1998) 12 Seton Hall Legis. J. 17; "Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation," supra note 3; and M.A.
Perino, "Drafting Mediation Privileges: Lessons From the Civil Justice Reform Act" (1995) 26
Seton Hall L. Rev. 1.
69 See Hyman, supra note 68 at 19.
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There is the matter of defining the circumstances in which the
protection will apply. What is a "mediation" for these purposes? 70 How
is it distinguishable from arbitration and other forms of third party
intervention in disputes? If a teacher intervenes in a playground
dispute, or a bystander intervenes in an argument between two drivers
following an accident, will they be obliged to keep what they hear
confidential thereafter?71
There is also the issue of when the protection begins. Is it when
the disputants meet with the mediator to engage in assisted mediation?
What about an initial exploratory discussion between the disputants, or
between a disputant and a mediator or mediation program staff, about
whether they will or why they should have a mediation?72 Similarly,
when do the protected circumstances end?
What communications will be privileged: all of them, or just
those relating to "the dispute"? Statutes in some states of the United
States apply only to the latter. 73 In that event, is "the dispute" confined
to the rights dispute that might otherwise have been the subject of
litigation? Must the parties' dispute include a justiciable issue-a
dispute about legally enforceable rights and obligations-before it can
receive this protection? Is it sufficient that one of the parties
subjectively believes there is a justiciable dispute, or must this be
objectively true?
What constitutes a communication: is it limited to speech and
writing, or is non-verbal conduct included? Must a communication
occur in the presence of the mediator to be protected, or would
communications between the parties while the mediator is out of the
room be covered? Are all documents prepared for the purpose of the
mediation covered, or only those that are exchanged by the parties or
provided to the mediator?
In addition to defining the communications to be protected from
disclosure in evidence, a carefully crafted mediation privilege should be
clear about the sort of proceedings in which evidence of the
communications will be inadmissible. Is the protection available only in
pending proceedings arising out of the dispute being mediated 74 or to all
70 See Brown, supra note 21 at 326-29.
71 See Kirtley, supra note 3 at 22.
72 See Brown, supra note 21 at 329.
73 See ibid. at 318; and Kirtley, supra note 3 at 35-39.
74 In some provinces, the protection afforded to discussions in settlement conferences is
limited in that manner: see Epp, supra note 10.
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proceedings regardless of subject matter? Does the protection preclude
reference to the communication in a subsequent mediation?75 Does it
operate against persons who were not participants in the mediation? It
seems prudent to be clear also about whether the protection extends to
pre-trial discovery or to proceedings before tribunals other than courts.76
In Canada, there is the added complication that provincial
legislation cannot dictate rules of evidence in criminal proceedings and,
presumably, other matters within federal jurisdiction. Thus, while
provincial provisions may appear to make evidence of mediation
communications inadmissible in all proceedings, this will not be so as a
matter of law. This is a potential trap for unwary mediators and
mediation participants.
2. Defining the exceptions
Otherwise discoverable documents should not be precluded from
proof in subsequent proceedings merely because they are disclosed
during mediation: "the privilege should not permit mediation to become
a black hole into which parties can purposefully bury unhelpful
evidence." 77 There is, however, a concern that mediation may become a
discovery process in which protected communications become the means
by which parties are alerted to facts of which they may then seek
"otherwise discoverable" evidence. 78 Such a restriction could complicate
litigation with inquiries into how parties discovered the evidence they
present, when it is alleged that the issue was addressed in mediation. It
would be worrisome to go to mediation before completing examinations
for discovery in a regime with a mediation privilege that extends to
"evidence arising" from mediation communications.
General provisions for mediation privilege should be clear about
how the mediator or a mediation participant is to resolve conflicts
between the provision's requirement that mediation communications be
kept confidential, and disclosure requirements imposed by other statutes
75 See Hyman, supra note 68 at 33.
76 See Kirtley, supra note 3 at 27-28.
7 7 Ibid. at 39-41. See also Hyman, supra note 68 at 32.
78 The reference to "evidence arising from anything said" in a Saskatchewan provision,
referred to infra note 93 and accompanying text, appears to be an attempt to address that concern.
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or by the rules governing professions to which a mediator or mediation
participant may belong. 79
When a public body participates in or provides mediation, there
will be questions whether privilege provisions are overridden by, or
override, freedom of information legislation or the provision of any
"sunshine" law requiring that proceedings of the public body take place
in public. A provision of general application with respect to mediation
privilege should explicitly address those conflicts as well as conflicts
between the general provisions and provisions of other legislation
governing mediation in specific circumstances.
Assessments of the extent to which an exception may be
warranted for communications about criminal conduct generally
distinguish between admissions of past criminal behaviour, on the one
hand, and admissions of ongoing criminal conduct and threats or-
expressions of intent to commit crimes in the future, on the other. The
nature of the crime is also a consideration. A problem frequently
mooted is whether privilege should apply to communications indicating
that a participant intends to cause serious physical harm or death to
another mediation participant or to a third party.8 0 Legislation may
provide an exception in those circumstances, allowing the mediator or
any other participant in receipt of such communications to warn the
intended victim. Commentators have suggested that admissions of past
crime do not raise a comparable concern, and that excepting such
admissions from the privilege would unduly chill the mediation
process.8 1
The purpose of a strong mediation privilege is to enhance the
prospect that an agreement will result from mediation. If privilege
precludes evidence of all mediation communications, however, then an
agreement that results from offer and acceptance communicated during
mediation will be unenforceable. The object of the privilege warrants an
exception for disclosure to prove the terms of, and enforce, an
agreement that results from mediation.8 2 It follows that disclosure
should likewise be permitted to defend against enforcement where
fraud, duress, misrepresentation, and the like are alleged to have
79 See Said, supra note 9; Hess, supra note 9; and Irvine, supra note 9.
80 See E.L. Kuester, "Confidentiality in Mediation: A Trail of Broken Promises" (1995) 16
Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 573 at 593.
81 See Kirtley, supra note 3 at 45.
82 See "Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation," supra note 3 at 452-54.
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occurred during mediation.8 3 Some American statutes provide that
these exceptions for enforcement and defence apply only to written
agreements.8 4
Issues also arise about whether the existence or terms of an
agreement that results from mediation can be kept confidential from
third parties. Maintaining the confidentiality of the resultant agreement
is, arguably, not as essential to the efficacy of the mediation process as is
maintaining the confidentiality of the surrounding discussions.85
Commentators have suggested that third parties should at least be
entitled to disclosure of such agreements to prove fraud, illegality, or
duress,8 6 or where disclosure of the agreement would otherwise be
required by law.87
A mediation privilege will not foster confidence in the mediation
process if it is seen as a potential cloak for mediator misconduct. Thus,
an exception for disclosure in actions by a mediating party against the
mediator is often seen as appropriate.88 If the time frame covered by the
privilege begins before the parties and mediator enter into an agreement
to mediate, an exception will be necessary also to permit enforcement of
the terms of that agreement, including enforcement by the mediator of
the parties' obligations with respect to the mediator's fees and
disbursements.
A distinction should be made between circumstances in which a
party is required or permitted to testify about, or introduce evidence of,
mediation communications, and circumstances in which the mediator
may be required to do so. Except in actions by or against the mediator,
there is, arguably, no reason to permit or require the mediator to testify
that outweighs the attendant potential for damage to the mediation
process. With the exception of the mediator's notes, recollections, and
private opinions, any relevant information known to the mediator will be
83 See ibid. at 453; and Kirtley, supra note 3 at 51.
84 See J.M. Assey Jr., "Mum's the Word on Mediation: Confidentiality and Snyder-Falkinham
v. Stockburger" (1996) 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 991; and Kuester, supra note 80 at 581-82.
85 See Kirtley, supra note 3 at 43.
86 See Kuester, supra note 80 at 591.
87 One example is when there has been a "Mary Carter" agreement, pursuant to which the
plaintiff in an action settles with a co-defendant on terms that leave the defendant in the action, but
limit its liability to an amount that depends on the amount recovered at trial from the co-
defendant(s) who did not settle: see Hyman, supra note 68 at 49.
88 See Hyman, supra note 68 at 37-38; and Kirtley, supra note 3 at 49.
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known to at least one other mediation participant.8 9 The temptation to
secure independent or "tie-breaking" evidence should be resisted for the
reasons elaborated in the labour relations jurisprudence.
B. Canadian Legislation
In contrast with the comprehensive legislation that has
developed in at least some states of the United States, Canadian
legislation providing for mediation of disputes has used a variety of
simple formulae for the protection of confidentiality. A federal statute
on environmental assessment, for example, provides that
[n]o evidence of or relating to a statement made by a mediator or a participant to the
mediation during the course of and for the purposes of the mediation is admissible
without the consent of the mediator or participant, in any proceeding before a review
panel, court, tribunal, body or person with jurisdiction to compel the production of
evidence.90
The Ontario Children's Law Reforn Act9l provides that if the parties so
request, a court to which an application for custody of or access to a
child is made may appoint a person selected by the parties to mediate
any matter specified in the order. If the parties agree that the mediator
is to report to the court only on whether or not they have come to
agreement, then the statute provides that "evidence of anything said or
of any admission or communication made in the course of the mediation
is not admissible in any proceeding except with the consent of all parties
to the proceeding in which the order was made ... .- 92 Court-annexed
mediation in Saskatchewan is protected by this provision:
Evidence arising from anything said, evidence of anything said or evidence of an
admission or communication made in the course of mediation or in a mediation
screening and orientation session is not admissible in any cause or matter or proceeding
before a court, except with the written consent of the mediator and all parties to the
cause or matter in which the mediator acted.93
89 See Harter, supra note 14 at 349.
90 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37, s. 32(2).
91 R.S.O. 1990, c. C-12, s. 31.
92 Ibid. s. 3 1(7).
93 The Queen's Bench Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. Q-1, as am. by The Queen's Bench (Mediation)
AmendmentAct, 1994, S.S. 1994, c. 20, s. 54.3.
690 [VOL. 36 No. 4
1998] Confidentiality in Mediation 691
The Practice Directions issued by the Ontario Court (General
Division) in 199494 and 199595 concerning its Toronto Region
Alternative Dispute Resolution Pilot Project provided that:
5.1 Prior to participating in an A.D.R. session, the parties are required to enter into and
file at the A.D.R. Centre an agreement in Form 3, indicating their agreement that
(a) statements made and documents produced in an A.D.R. Session or in the pre-session
conference, and not otherwise discoverable, are not subject to disclosure through
discovery or any other process and are not admissible into evidence for any purpose,
including impeaching credibility,
(b) the notes, record, and recollections of the judge or dispute resolution officer
conducting the A.D.R. Session are confidential and protected from disclosure for all
purposes,
5.2 Users of private A.D.R. services may wish to enter into express agreements
addressing, among other things, the matters described in paragraph 5.1, clauses (a) and
(b).96
Rules promulgated by the Ontario Courts' Civil Rules Committee for
the Mandatory Mediation Program that came into effect in January
1999, however, provide only that "[a]ll communications at a mediation
session and the mediator's notes and records shall be deemed to be
without prejudice to settlement discussions." 9 7  This leaves the
confidentiality of mediations in that program subject to all the vagaries
of the law concerning the settlement discussion privilege, including the
potential difficulties for interest-based mediation of the rights and
relevance orientation of the case law. Mediators may be obliged to
testify about mediation communications whenever parties would be
permitted to do so, as when there is a dispute about the existence,
meaning, or enforceability of an agreement alleged to have arisen from
mediation. By tying confidentiality to a privilege that is the parties' to
enforce or waive in their own interests, the new rule does not appear to
afford the mediation process the sort of independent protection that it
arguably should have.
94 See The Honourable R. Roy McMurtry, Chief Justice of the Ontario Court and The
Honourable A.G. Campbell, Regional Senior Justice, "Practice Directions-Alternative Dispute
Resolution-1994" (1994), 16 O.R. (3d) 481.
95 See The Honourable R. Roy McMurtry, Chief Justice of the Ontario Court and The
Honourable A.G. Campbell, Regional Senior Justice, "Practice Directions-Alternative Dispute
Resolution-1995" (1995), 24 O.R. (3d) 161.
96 Ibid. at 169.
97 Ontario, Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, as am. by 0. Reg. 453/98, r.
24.1.14.
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VI. THE 1996 MANITOBA LAW REFORM COMMISSION STUDY
The Manitoba Law Reform Commission ("Commission")
recently studied the question of confidentiality of mediation proceedings
at the suggestion of the Manitoba Bar Association's Alternative Dispute
Resolution Section. 98 Its April 1996 report on the subject addressed the
question of whether a statutory privilege should attach to all mediation
communications, so as to make evidence about them inadmissible in
subsequent proceedings.
The Commission took note of two difficulties with the coverage
afforded by the common law privilege for settlement discussions. One
was that communications may not be protected if a court later concludes
that they were not "for the purpose of settlement" of issues raised by the
parties' legal dispute. The Commission observed that this "leads to the
advisability of employing lawyers to conduct carefully-worded
negotiations," 99 and that
[t]he Springridge case illustrates why advocates of mediation privilege do not favour
simply extending the common law privilege to cover mediation as well. In "lawyerless,
freewheeling" mediation sessions, it is asserted, parties get to the "real issues" between
them, which are often not those upon which litigation negotiating would narrowly and
legalistically focus. Parties must feel confident that they can discuss absolutely anything
in an unhindered manner. This cannot be achieved if parties must worry that some
statements could be severed as independent from the settlement negotiations and later
used as evidence.100
The other difficulty noted by the Commission was the uncertainty about
whether the common law privilege protects negotiations against
discovery or admission into evidence by a third party who was a stranger
both to the negotiations and to the dispute with which those negotiations
were concerned.10
The Commission recited many of the arguments made in the
literature for and against according a privilege, particularly a "blanket"
privilege affording protection without exception.102 It also referred to
and reaffirmed the conclusion it had reached when it earlier studied the
need for a medical privilege: that new privileges should not be created by
98 See Confidentiality of Mediation Proceedings, supra note 10 at 2.
99 lbib at 6.
100 Ibid. at 7, referring to Re Springridge Farms Ltd., supra note 36 [footnote omitted].
101 See Confidentiality of Mediation Proceedings, supra note 10 at 7-8.
102 Ibid. at 13-18.
[VOL. 36 No. 4
Confidentiality in Mediation
statute but, rather, it should be left to the courts to apply privilege in
accordance with the Wigmore test on a case-by-case basis.03
The Commission was prepared, however, to recommend a more
limited statutory protection grounded on the principle that litigants who
attempt to resolve their differences through mediation should be neither
advantaged nor disadvantaged relative to those who do so by resorting to
negotiation without a mediator. The Commission assumed that a court
would likely extend the common law privilege for settlement
negotiations to communications for which the mediating parties and the
mediator were all present. Thus, it said "the discussions between the
mediating parties in the mediator's presence will be as privileged or not
privileged as would have been the case had they negotiated in the
absence of a mediator."1 04
The Commission stated that its proposed reform would focus on
the one factor which makes mediation different from other types of settlement
negotiations: the presence of a mediator (1) who is privy to secrets which the parties
confided to the mediator in private caucus and which they do not know about each other,
and (2) who takes personal notes and forms his or her own opinions and impressions
about the issues, parties and merits of the dispute, even though these are not used to
impose any resolution.10 5
To that end, it proposed that the Manitoba Evidence Act06 be amended
to provide that mediators are non-competent and non-compellable as
witnesses concerning mediation communications. Thus, a mediator 07
could neither be compelled to testify, nor voluntarily testify, in any legal
proceedinglO8 about information acquired or opinions formed while
acting as a mediator,109 nor to produce notes made in that capacity. This
103 Ibid. at 18-19.
104 Ibid. at 19.
105 Ibid.
106 R.S.M. 1987, c. E150.
107 The Commission considered whether to define "mediator" by reference to the
circumstances giving rise to the mediation or the qualifications of the mediator. It concluded that
for this purpose "mediator" should be defined to mean someone whom mediating parties have
identified as the mediator in a written agreement executed prior to the mediation, whether he or
she is to be paid or not, and that the protection should extend to an agent or employee of the
mediator: see Confidentiality of Mediation Proceedings, supra note 10 at 22-25.
108 The Commission recommended that this testimonial immunity be extended to legal
proceedings that are subject to provincial constitutional authority, noting that provincial legislation
could not provide testimonial immunity in matters, such as criminal proceedings, in which the
federal government has constitutional authority over the law of evidence: see ibid. at 28-29.
109 Ibid. at 27.
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immunity would apply whether or not the issue in the subsequent
proceeding was the same as any issue in the mediation, and regardless
whether the issues in mediation had been resolved or not. The
Commission observed that this would "create 'a level playing field' by
ensuring that mediating parties will not be worse off than other
litigants-they will not have to fear that the mediator could disclose
confidences revealed only to the mediator or be used as an adverse
source of unique information."I0
The Commission also proposed that the testimonial immunity
afforded by its proposed statutory amendments should not apply (1) if
the decisionmaker in the subsequent action or legal proceeding
concludes in the circumstances of the case that the public interest in the
proper administration of justice outweighs in importance the mediator's
testimonial immunity (described by the Commission as a "Discretionary
Override to Protect the Public Interest");"ll (2) where the subsequent
legal proceeding is to enforce, amend, or set aside the mediated
agreement or is brought by the mediator against a mediation party (or
vice versa);112 (3) where the mediator and mediation parties agree in
writing to waive its application;"13 or (4) to a mediator who conducts a
mediation under another Act or regulation." 4
The Commission prefaced its study and recommendations with
the observation that "[a]ny issue of privilege raises a fundamental
conflict between the desire for confidentiality on the part of the
privilege-seeker and the need of the traditional justice system for access
to all relevant evidence so that a fair legal judgment may be
rendered."11 5 Applied to the issue at hand, this framed the interest in
protecting confidentiality as an individual interest, and set it up against
an interest of the justice system and, hence, a public interest. The
interest in protecting confidentiality could have been framed as a public
interest. The interest in the availability of evidence to the litigation of a
dispute, particularly a private civil dispute, could have been framed as an
individual interest of the disputants. Each interest can be viewed from
both an individual and a public interest perspective.
110 ibid. at 19-20.
111 Ibid. at 30-31.
112 ibid. at 31-32.
113 Ibid. at 32-33.
114 Ibid. at 33-34.
115 Ibid. at 2.
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The competing interests have to be compared from the same
perspective. The question ought to be "which of the competing public
interests-the interest in encouraging settlement or the interest in
having all relevant evidence available to the court or tribunal-is more
compelling in the circumstances?" The appropriate framing of the
competing interests is of particular concern when it is suggested that
decisionmakers be given a power to authorize disclosure of confidential
communications after the fact "to protect the public interest."
In formulating its recommendations for reform, the Commission
took the approach that disputants should be neither advantaged nor
disadvantaged, as regards the protection from disclosure of their
settlement negotiations, by resorting to mediated rather than
unmediated negotiation. It therefore focused on identifying the
differences between mediated and unmediated negotiation and assessing
whether and to what extent those differences warranted differential
treatment.
The Commission seems to have thought that the only relevant
difference between unmediated negotiations and mediated negotiations
in joint session, when each party hears what the other says, is that the
mediator is present as a witness. All that was required to level the
playing field with respect to communications in joint session, therefore,
was to preclude the possibility of the mediator's testifying. It is not
apparent whether the Commission thought this was the only respect in
which communications in mediated joint sessions might differ from
those in unmediated negotiations, or whether it simply felt that such
differences as there might be did not warrant protection different from
that accorded to unmediated negotiations.
The Commission did acknowledge, as I have already noted, that
the existing state of the law concerning the privilege attaching to
settlement discussions made it advisable that lawyers be employed to
conduct the negotiations.116 It also noted that advocates of mediation
privilege speak of "lawyerless, freewheeling" mediation sessions in which
the issues discussed go beyond those upon which negotiations between
litigation lawyers would "narrowly and legalistically focus." 117 The
implications of that dichotomy want further consideration.
In fact, unmediated negotiations about the settlement of
litigation are typically conducted by lawyers as spokespersons for, and
generally in the absence of, the disputants they represent. They tend to
116 Ibid. at 6.
1171Ibid. at 7.
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focus on what the lawyers are engaged to focus on: the outcome each
party seeks if the matter goes to a third-party decisionmaker for
determination, the likelihood of success based on the disputed legal and
factual issues, and the costs and uncertainties associated with pursuing
the process. The lawyers exchange offers of settlement in an attempt to
find a compromise they can sell to their respective clients as a fair
measure of their legal entitlement suitably discounted to reflect those
considerations. 18 Any accompanying explanation tends to focus on
allegations relevant to the legal issues and the client's willingness to buy
peace by compromising-communications that judges are likely to
regard as sufficiently connected with their conception of settlement
negotiations to warrant treating them as privileged.
By contrast, direct communication by and between disputants is
generally encouraged in mediation. The disputants' lawyers, if present,
may play a less controlling role, serving more as advisors and resources
to their clients and less as advocates for them. Discussions in mediation
tend to focus on issues of importance to the disputants without limiting
the discussion to considerations that would be relevant to a
determination of the parties' legal rights, or to outcomes that fall within
the range of remedies available from a court in vindication of those
rights. The participants are encouraged to explore alternatives without
first committing to them, to go behind opening positions to the interests
they reflect. An interest-oriented or problem-solving approach in
mediation does not ignore the rights issues at stake7 19 but encourages
thinking outside or without regard to the box drawn by those issues, in
the search for solutions that may be more satisfactory to both parties
than any that lie within that box. As communications range outside that
box, however, they may also be venturing outside the protection from
disclosure that a court or tribunal might later afford them.
It might be argued that the differences between typical
unmediated and mediated negotiations described here warrant
extending the privilege that attaches to mediated negotiations, so as to
ensure that what actually takes place in one is as fully protected as what
actually takes place in the other.
118 See generally C. Menkel-Meadow, "Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem Solving" (1984) 31 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 754; and C. Menkel-Meadow, "Lawyer
Negotiations: Theories and Realities-What We Learn From Mediation" (1993) 56 Mod. L. Rev.
361.
119 Rights-oriented considerations form part of the uATNA (Best Alternatives to a Negotiated
Agreement) against which disputants will assess their willingness to adopt any option generated by
an interest-oriented or problem-solving process.
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It might also be argued that the differences described are not the
necessary consequence of introducing a mediator into settlement
negotiations. Processes described as mediation can be as rights-oriented
as typical unmediated, lawyer-conducted settlement negotiations-and
some are. More importantly, perhaps, unmediated negotiations can take
a more interest-oriented or problem-solving approach. They can be
structured so that the parties play a more direct role. Communications
in unmediated negotiation can be as wide-ranging as mediation
communications are said to be. One .of the benefits parties may derive
from participating in mediation is an increased ability to resolve disputes
in an interest-based way without the assistance of a mediator.12 0 Thus, if
the existing law concerning privilege for settlement communications is
problematic for joint sessions in mediation then, arguably, it is similarly
problematic for unmediated settlement negotiations. While it may be
true, therefore, that the scope of privilege for settlement discussions
should be the same for unmediated negotiations as for joint sessions in
mediation, it does not follow that no change in that scope is needed to
give mediation communications appropriate protection.
Even if the focus and manner of the underlying negotiation is in
all possible respects the same with or without a mediator, the mediator
still adds something to the process by helping the parties overcome or
tunnel through psychological and other barriers to agreement that are
inherent in unassisted negotiation. 121  It may be that introducing
mediated settlement negotiation into the litigation process at some stage
is more likely to achieve settlements-or to do so at less cost to the
disputants and with less consumption of public resources-than when
settlement is the subject only of unmediated negotiations. That is
certainly one of the major premises of court-connected programs that
mandate attendance on a mediator as part of the litigation process.
Canadian law recognizes a public policy interest in encouraging the
negotiated settlement of disputes. That is the policy basis for the
common law privilege presently accorded to settlement discussions,
mediated or otherwise. Mediation may better advance that public
interest and, accordingly, may warrant advantaging mediation over other
forms of negotiation when balancing the need for protection of
communications in mediation against other competing interests.
The Commission acknowledged the argument that advantaging
mediation would encourage resort to it and increase the likelihood of
120 See McCrory, supra note 16 at 443.
121 See R.A.B. Bush, "'What Do We Need a Mediator For?': Mediation's 'Value-Added' For
Negotiators" (1996) 12 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 1.
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settlements occurring without resort to litigation. It seemed to accept
one commentator's assertion that this argument is based on "the same
justifications of expediency used to justify plea-bargaining when it
became an accepted and necessary practice."1 22 The Commission then
aligned that argument with criticisms of the efficacy of the justice system,
which it said it could not assess without engaging in an "in-depth
consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of the entire Canadian
justice system" that, in turn, was beyond the scope of the question it had
set out to study.123
Some advocates of mediation do position it as an alternative to
adjudication, and offer criticisms of the traditional justice system in its
support. A more positive perspective is that mediated negotiation is an
alternative to unmediated negotiation, which is well established as an
alternative to and complement of adjudication. The justice system
already values the negotiated settlement of disputes that might
otherwise require adjudication. In practical terms, at least, negotiated
settlement and adjudication each depend on the efficacy of the other for
its own efficacy. If mediated settlement negotiation is more efficacious
than the unmediated sort, then it is no slight to the justice system to
suggest that the benefits of increased protection of confidential
settlement discussions in mediation outweigh the disadvantages such
protection might create.
The Commission's approach to the problem of confidentiality in
mediation helpfully underscores the need to distinguish between the
protection appropriate to the parties and the protection appropriate to
the mediator. Any assessment of the protection from disclosure that
communications in mediation should receive must take into account the
two features identified by the Commission: (1) that in caucus mediators
may receive information from one party that is intended to be, and is,
kept confidential, from the other party, and (2) that the mediator may
take notes of and form opinions about and is, in any event, a witness to
communications in joint session and caucus.
It does seem appropriate to adopt a basic rule that the mediator
cannot testify or be compelled to testify about information obtained
while acting as mediator, and to apply the rule to all future proceedings
and against third parties as well as the mediating parties. The provision
that this forced testimonial immunity could be waived by the mediating
parties and the mediator, and not just by the mediating parties alone, is
122 Confidentiality of Mediation Proceedings, supra note 10 at 14-15, citing Murphy, supra note 8
at 241.
123 Confidentiality of Mediation Proceedings, supra note 10 at 15.
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sensible, as is the provision that the mediator may testify in subsequent
proceedings in which a party sues the mediator, or vice versa.
The Commission said it did not believe that the proposed
"discretionary override" would be used by decisionmakers to restrict the
protection "more than necessary," since the fact that the immunity had
been conferred on mediators in general terms would signify that the
immunity was to have priority over the need for a mediator's evidence in
all but extraordinary circumstances. The Commission suggested that
such circumstances might exist "[w]here ... parties retain a mediator for
tortious or unlawful purposes, or create a false fagade of a mediation in
order to confer non-compellability on a disreputable person with key
knowledge by casting that person as 'the mediator'." 124
A court or other decisionmaker might interpret the proposed
legislation as having simply removed uncertainty about whether caucus
communications that are not revealed to the opposite party, and which
for that reason might not be treated as settlement discussions between
disputants, should nevertheless be as protected as settlement discussions
conducted between disputants directly or through agents. On that view,
the proposed discretionary public interest override might be used to
carve out of the mediator immunity the same sort of exceptions that
apply to unmediated settlement discussions. That would unnecessarily
undermine the role of mediators in the manner previously discussed. A
more narrowly framed exception could address the identified problem of
mediations with unlawful purposes without putting the scope of
protection in as much doubt.
The Commission offered this explanation for its proposal that
mediator immunity should not apply in any subsequent action between
the mediating parties to enforce, amend, or set aside any agreement that
results from the mediation:
Where a mediation has been successful and a mediated agreement has been reached, the
mediator's testimony may be crucial if a subsequent proceeding is required to enforce,
amend or set aside that agreement. Mediator non-competence and non-compellability
would serve only to work an injustice in these circumstances. If an exception were not
made here,
the ... [protection statutewould] undermine parties' legitimate interests both
in realizing the fruits of mediation and in protecting themselves from fraud,
duress, and mistake .... Although confidentiality is crucial to preserving the
position of parties that have failed to reach an agreement, parties that have
124 Ibid. at 31.
1998]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
reached agreement should not be forced to purchase free discussion at the cost
of waiving traditional contract law protection against unfairness.1 25
The protection statutes criticized in the commentary quoted by the
Commission are statutes that "grant blanket protection to all
communications made in mediation,"126 thus proscribing testimony by
the parties as well as by the mediator. The author of that commentary
did identify two situations in which confidentiality should yield to the
need for evidence in order to preserve the integrity of the mediation
process: (1) when one of the parties sues to enforce or rescind an
agreement that results from mediation, and (2) when a party brings suit
alleging breach of duty by another party or the mediator during the
mediation process. The author argued that a party should be allowed to
adduce evidence of mediation communications in those circumstances.
The author observed, however, that "[t]he decision to allow the
admission into evidence of certain communications made in mediation
does not determine who should be allowed to testify to them." 127 The
author went on to review the arguments for a separate mediator
privilege not to testify concerning even communications that fall within
an exception to the privilege for party-party communications, about
which the parties themselves would therefore be free to testify.)28
The exception proposed by the Commission is not needed to
make the parties' testimony about, and documents from, mediation
discussions admissible in an action to enforce or set aside an agreement
reached in mediation. Without the proposed exception, the parties are
deprived only of the mediator's "tie-breaking" testimony. In that respect
they are in the same position as parties to unmediated negotiations, who
must rely on direct communication, written or oral, in order to have
proof of the terms of any agreement they may think they have reached.
They have the same means at their disposal to minimize potential
problems of proof. As the jurisprudence of labour tribunals suggests,
the public interest in providing a "tie-breaking" witness is not as great as
the public interest in ensuring the integrity and efficacy of the mediation
process.
125 Ibid., citing "Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation," supra note 3 at 453.
126 "Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation," supra note 3 at 452.
127 Ibid. at 454.
128 See ibid. at 454-57.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The common law protection for settlement discussions is
intended to foster the negotiated settlement of disputes without unduly
compromising other important interests served by the legal system. In
formulating that protection and exceptions to its application, the courts
have had to balance many of the considerations that must be weighed in
crafting appropriate protection for the confidentiality of
communications in mediation. That has been done, naturally enough,
from a perspective that reflects the way lawyers have traditionally
approached the settlement of disputes that they first define and then
value in legal terms. This is reflected in, among other things, the courts'
use of notions of relevance to determine boundaries between
communications that serve the purpose of the privilege, and should
therefore be protected, and those that do not and should not. This
rights-based approach may disadvantage the kind of negotiation
mediation encourages. On that basis alone, the common law privilege
may have to be rethought, clarified, and adjusted to facilitate the
growing use of mediation as a means of resolving disputes.
This is not to say that the common law position should be
ignored or abandoned in favour of a blanket privilege. That may harm a
core interest otherwise served by protecting confidentiality: it may make
it difficult to enforce any agreement reached in mediation, for example,
or create a bargaining environment that is uncomfortable because while
the parties are in it, rules that would normally constrain improper
conduct will be harder to enforce. An overly broad confidentiality
statute or rule for mediated negotiation may attract a limiting judicial
interpretation if it appears not to have addressed important concerns
reflected in the existing case law.
The Manitoba Law Reform Commission so defined the
questions it addressed that an important issue remained unstudied:
whether the scope of the privilege that attaches to inter-party settlement
discussions should be clarified or changed for mediation in ways that
would also bear application to unmediated negotiation. It may be
unduly confining to focus only on the need for reform of protection for
direct negotiations conducted in the presence of a mediator.
Any effort at crafting appropriate protection for confidential
mediation communications must address two distinct but related
questions: (1) what communications should be protected from disclosure
of any kind, and (2) what testimonial immunity the mediator should
have. The principles that guide assessment of the first issue are not the
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only ones relevant to the second. The interest of mediators in
maintaining the appearance of impartiality, and the public interest in the
efficacy of mediation, ought to be given significant weight. For the
reasons elaborated by labour relations tribunals, mediators should not
become the potential eyes and ears of the court or tribunal during
mediation merely so that possible conflicts in the parties' later testimony
can be more easily resolved.
Exceptions to privilege for actions to enforce or to set aside a
mediated agreement, and for actions between the parties and the
mediator, exemplify a more general issue about maintaining the
enforceability of the legal obligations that, but for the privilege, would
exist or arise enforceably during the mediation process. There seems to
be no compelling reason why evidence of serious criminal conduct
committed during mediation should be inadmissible in proceedings to
prosecute the perpetrator. Similarly, evidence of tortious misconduct
that occurs during mediation--conversion, assault, or defamation, for
example-should be admissible in an action to remedy that misconduct.
A privilege should likewise permit the admission of evidence of
mediation communications in an action for an injunction to restrain a
continuing or threatened breach of a contractual or statutory obligation
to keep such communications confidential, 129 or for damages for a
breach of that obligation, for example.
Overly broad and simply worded confidentiality provisions may
do unnecessary harm as well as the intended good. In the long term, it is
in the interest of the mediation process that such provisions evolve to
reflect a finer balance of the interests in play, while at the same time
providing clarity and certainty, and reducing the dependence of
disputants on lawyers to keep settlement discussions within protected
bounds.
129 See Hyman, supra note 68 at 51.
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